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THE 2004 GUNDERSON LECTURE:
APPRENDI, BLAKELY AND FEDERALISM
PETER B. RUTLEDGE

t

The Clark Y. Gunderson Lecture is a memorial to a man who devoted his
life to legal education and spent thirty years teaching at the Law School.
It is supported by a trust fund in the University of South Dakota Law
School Foundation established principally by Colonel Gunderson's
family. Professor Rutledge delivered the 2004 Gunderson Lecture at the
Law Review's Symposium on Sentencing and Punishment, which took
place at the Law School on November 5, 2004. In addition to Professor
Rutledge, attendees included U.S. District ChiefJudge Lawrence Piersol,
U.S. Attorney James McMahon, and Attorney General Larry Long.
Professor Chris Hutton moderated the discussion. What follows is an
adapted version of ProfessorRutledge's lecture.
Judge Piersol, U.S. Attorney McMahon, Attorney General Long, Dean
Vickrey, Professor Hutton and members of the faculty, students and other guests,
especially members of the Gunderson family, thank for the opportunity to
deliver this year's Gunderson Lecture. It is a great honor.
As I have learned about Colonel Gunderson, I find the opportunity to give
this address a particular honor. He left the Law School to serve his country in
the 1940s and was instrumental in establishing the Judge Advocate General
Corps, the elite corps of lawyers responsible for handling the military's
prosecutions and other legal matters. My invitation here stemmed from a speech
that I gave to a group of judge advocate generals and judges at the Judicial
Conference of the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces earlier this year. After
that speech, Damian Richard, the symposium editor of your law review, first
approached me about participating in this Symposium and later formally
extended the invitation from Dean Vickrey to deliver the annual Gunderson
Lecture. Given Colonel Gunderson's background, I find it especially appropriate
that the contact which brought me to your beloved law school took place at a
forum that Colonel Gunderson probably would have cared so deeply about.
The topic of this year's symposium is Sentencing and Punishment. This
topic could not be more timely. As you know, issues of sentencing and
punishment have been a dominant part of the Supreme Court's docket over the
past several years. Last year, a closely divided Supreme Court held in Blakely v.
Washington that the State of Washington's Sentencing Guidelines violated the
Constitution's jury guarantee.1 That decision, which I will discuss in greater
t Assistant Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, Catholic University of America. I am
grateful to Dean William Fox at the Dean's Research Fund at the Columbus School of Law for generous
financial assistance. Douglas Berman, Dwight Sullivan and John Holt provided thoughtful insights on
my research on this topic. Lynn Rosenstock, Alan Levine, Holly Kuebler and Nicole Angarella provided
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detail later in my remarks, not only affected Washington's scheme specifically,
but also sent shockwaves throughout the legal and academic community over
how it might affect other states' sentencing schemes and the federal sentencing
guidelines. Most recently, since the time of the original lecture, the Supreme
Court has held that the Blakely principle applies to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, with the consequence that the Guidelines are now merely advisory,
not mandatory. 2 So I commend the editors of the Law Review for selecting such
a fine topic for their symposium.
Within that broad topic, I will be speaking on the specific issue of the Jury
Right and Federalism. To those of you who write or work in the area regularly,
the connection between these topics will be immediately apparent. To those of
you less familiar with the area, let me briefly help you draw the connection.
Most criminal law questions boil down to four basic issues. The first is
what to punish: we punish taking someone else's property, but we don't punish
criminally the use of insulting words? 3 Second, how much do we punish?4
excellent research assistance. Steve Young, a research librarian at the Columbus School of Law,
provided invaluable support.
I previously discussed some of the ideas explored in this speech in an essay in the Federal
Sentencing Reporter. See Rutledge, Apprendi and Federalism, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 100 (2004). I am
grateful to the Vera Institute of Justice, the copyright holder of that essay, for the opportunity to republish some of those ideas in this speech.
1. Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
2. United States v. Booker & United States v. Fanfan, 125 S. Ct. 738, 749-50 (2005). When I
originally delivered the Gunderson Lecture, Booker and Fanfan had only recently been argued. As
Professor Hutton noted during the symposium, it was clear from the oral argument that the Supreme
Court was poised to extend Blakely to the Guidelines. Professor Christine Hutton, Address at the South
Dakota Law School Gunderson Lecture (Nov. 5, 2004) (Privately, I am grateful that, contrary to the
expectations of some Court-watchers, they did not do so in early November, sparing me the challenge of
having to redraft this entire speech!).
It is too early to tell the effect of Booker and Fanfan. At bottom, the Court announced three
holdings: (1) Blakely applies to the federal guidelines; (2) the guidelines are advisory, not mandatory;
and (3) district judges' sentencing decisions will now be subject to review for reasonableness, rather than
de novo review. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749-50.
Two aspects of the decision are especially noteworthy. First, though the Court announced that
the Guidelines are advisory, not mandatory, it also held that district judges "are bound to impose a
sentence within the Guidelines range." Id. at 750. Second, it is difficult to tell how the "reasonableness"
review on appeal will work. It could be quite stringent, requiring district courts to give good reasons
before departing from the range suggested by the "advisory" guidelines. See id. Alternatively, it could
be quite relaxed, requiring reversal only where the district judge has failed to consult the guidelines or
given no reason for a departure. See id.
As I write this footnote on Booker, speculation is rife among Blakely-watchers about whether
Justice Breyer persuaded Justice Ginsburg to change her position on the question of remedies following
the conference vote. Footnote eight of Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion provides strong evidence that
Justice Breyer did exactly that. Id. at 778 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting). That footnote contains the phrase
"as the dissent would have us do" - a phrase one normally would see only in a majority opinion.
Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Normally, when a justice changes positions post-conference, the author of the
original opinion for the Court faces the thankless task of "cleaning up" the draft to scrub it of any
indications that it once was the opinion for the Court. It appears that this reference slipped through the
cracks, providing an exceptional insight into the Court's internal deliberations on this case. Credit goes
to John Wool of the Vera Institute who first noticed this oddity in the Stevens opinion. See DOUGLAS
BERMAN, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY, http://sentencing.typepad.com/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2005)
(sentencing weblog maintained by OSU Professor Douglas Berman).
3. See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIM. & JUSTICE 1282 (Joshua
Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002) ("A second question concerns the necessary conditions for criminal liability
and punishment in particular cases.").
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Certain crimes such as murder potentially qualify a suspect for the death penalty
while others qualify for prison sentences. A third question, intimately tied to the
first two: why do we punish? 5 To deter this particular offender? To deter other
offenders? As a form of counterspeech to counteract the undesirable "message"
conveyed by a criminal act? Or for some other reason?
And then we come to what I believe is perhaps the most important question
and one that is, in my view, too often overlooked in the study of criminal law what institution should be making each of these decisions? 6 You can imagine a
variety of institutions in the criminal law realm: legislatures, prosecutors, judges,
and juries. Each plays a role, though that role has evolved over time. For
example, we now generally envision legislatures as largely responsible for the
first question - what do we punish. But that was not always the case. That
responsibility used to be vested, to a far greater extent, in courts. Likewise, we
might expect judges to be responsible for determining how much do we punish
(typically up to some maximum level set by the legislature). But that too has
changed over time, and sentencing commissions, at the federal level and in many
states, have assumed a greater share of those responsibilities.
The topic of my presentation - the jury right and federalism - lies at the
intersection of several of these philosophical and institutional questions.
Specifically, it considers the twin questions of: how much to punish and who
decides.
To supply some context, let's consider a deceptively simple example, the
federal carjacking statute:
Whoever. . . takes a motor vehicle . .. from the person or presence of
another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so,
shall (1) be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both,
(2) if serious bodily injury . . . results, be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and
for any number
(3) if death results, be fined
7 under this title or imprisoned
of years up to life, or both.
Now, you might say that the allocation of power to decide the various criminal
law questions in this example is clear. The legislature has answered the "what to
punish" question by setting forth the elements of carjacking. The prosecutor's
role is to decide whether she can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed each of the elements of this offense. The jury's role is
limited to fact finder - to decide whether the prosecutor has carried her burden of
4. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 447 (W. Hastie trans., 1887) ("But
what is the mode and measure of punishment which public justice takes as its principle and standard? It
is just the principle of equality, by which the pointer of the scale of justice is made to incline no more to
one side than the other.").
5. For a good synopsis of the views, see JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW §
2.03 at 13-19 (3d ed. 2001).
6. For a classic exposition of these institutional issues, see H.A. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401 (1958).
7. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2005).
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proving the facts beyond a reasonable doubt. And the judge largely decides the
"how much to punish" question within the maximum set by the legislature.
But this relatively simple allocation masks some more subtle distinctions.
For example, prosecutors also play a role in the "how much to punish question."
By choosing to charge a suspect with one form of carjacking (perhaps simple
carijacking) rather than an aggravated form, the prosecutor, through the charging
decision, can influence the amount of punishment meted out to a particular
defendant. Likewise, juries can help to decide "how much to punish." By
choosing to convict a defendant of one type of offense rather than another, they
are not simply working as fact finders. They are also functioning as law appliers
in deciding what type of conviction a particular defendant warrants and,
consequently, how severe the punishment can be.
Recent innovations in sentencing policy over the past two decades have
added further layers of complexity to this debate. For, consider the two features
of the carjacking statute - serious bodily injury and death. We might assume
that they are elements of the crime - namely, facts that the jury finds to have
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Though the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that these features of the
carjacking statute were elements, that conclusion was neither uncontroversial nor
obvious. 8 In many statutes like this one, legislatures and courts have treated
such facts as "sentencing factors" rather than elements. Elements of the offense
are facts comprising the definition of a crime. Sentencing factors, by contrast,
do not form part of the definition of the crime but, instead, guide the sentencing
entity's discretion once the defendant has been convicted. 9
The constitutional rules governing the treatment of these concepts differ in
two important respects: (1) the entity that must make the finding and (2) the
level of certainty with which the fact must be proven. In the case of elements,
the prosecution must prove them to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. In cases
of federal prosecutions, they also must be specified in the indictment. By
contrast, these same dictates do not apply to sentencing factors. Instead,
sentencing factors . pically are proven to a judge under a preponderance of the
evidence standard.'1
This dichotomy creates a dilemma. A legislature could easily circumvent
these restrictions simply by recasting certain facts as sentencing factors rather
than elements. For example, under a standard definition of burglary (breaking
and entering the home of another at night with the intent to commit a felony
therein), each of those facts forms part of the definition of the crime. Unless the
jury finds each one beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant will suffer no
punishment. But, if we took our sample burglary statute and redrafted it, so that
burglary consisted of "breaking the home of another" and then calibrated the
8.
9.
523 U.S.
10.

See generally Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 549 (2002); Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
224, 228 (1998).
Harris,536 U.S. at 549; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476-77 (2000).
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sentence to the other facts (entering, at night, with the intent to commit a felony),
that would have the effect of stripping several of those determinations from the
jury's province.
Now it's important to note that sentencing factors did not develop in a
vacuum. They involved the intersection of two developments in sentencing
policy. The first was a shift away from indeterminate sentencing. At the time of
11
to the jury's verdict.
the founding, a defendant's sentence was intimately tied
Whether the offense was defined at common law or by statute, the English trial
judge enjoyed relatively little sentencing discretion. In the 19 th century,
coinciding with penological reforms, we began to witness the rise of
indeterminate sentencing. 2 Judges enjoyed wide discretion to decide whether to
sentence the defendant to prison (and if so, for how long). By the middle of the
twentieth century, this system of indeterminate sentencing fell under sharp
criticism. 13 These criticisms included the complaint that serious discrepancies
existed in how sentences were meted out, depending often on the sentencing
practices of the individual judge rather than neutral criteria. Attempts at reform
culminated in a series of changes in the 1980s, including the Sentencing Reform
Commission. 14
Act of 1984, which created the United States Sentencing
Sentencing factors, whether contained in such guidelines or in statutes,
represented one way to channel the sentencer's discretion.
The second development was a growing legislative preference for the use of
mandatory minimum sentences. At the same time that sentencing reform
advocates were decrying the disparity in indeterminate sentencing, some
congressional officials were castigating judges who, in their view, were too soft
on certain criminals. 15 To counteract this trend in judicial leniency, Congress
began to insert mandatory minimum sentences into criminal statues directly,
which would constrain a sentencer's discretion and prevent the sentencer from
going below the minimum set by Congress once the jury (or a guilty plea) had
determined the guilt of the defendant. 16 Like sentencing factors, mandatory
minimum sentences also constrained a sentencer's discretion.
Until quite recently, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence established
virtually no constitutional oversight on sentencing practices (at least non-capital
ones), at the state or federal level. Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, a
growing number of justices on the Supreme Court began to express their
11. See Erik Lillquist, The Puzzling Return of Jury Sentencing: Misgivings about Apprendi, 82
N.C. L. REV. 621, 636-41 (2004). Juries also controlled development of the criminal law through their
nullification power. See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A BriefHistory of the CriminalJury
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 874-75 (1994).
12. Lillquist, supra note 11, at 641-53.
13. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Due Process, History, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 38 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 243, 247 (2001).
14. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987.
15. See generally Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States
Sentencing Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective
Sentencing System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 187-88 (1993).
16. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2002) (providing mandatory minimum punishments for certain
controlled substance offenses).
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discomfort with the growing use of sentencing factors. 17 In their view, the use
of such factors in lieu of offense elements stripped the jury of its function as a
circuit breaker in the governmental process leading to criminal punishment.
Originally anchoring their complaints in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause, they eventually settled upon the Sixth Amendment's jury
guarantee as the basis for their constitutional critique to check on this exercise of
legislative power. 18
Their critique developed in a series of decisions, and I will highlight three
here. The first was Apprendi v. New Jersey.19 In Apprendi, the Court
considered the constitutionality of New Jersey's hate crime law. That law
provided a penalty enhancement in cases where a crime was committed with the
purpose of intimidating a group or individual because of race. Five justices who
previously had signaled their dissatisfaction with such statutes in an earlier
federal case held that the New Jersey statute was unconstitutional. The Court
framed its holding broadly - any fact, except a prior conviction, that increases
the statutory maximum punishment must be proven to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt (the "prior conviction" exception was designed to preserve
Almendarez-Torres, which held that an offender's criminal history, unlike other
enhancers, traditionally was determined by azjudge - a decision that the Court
has signaled it may reconsider at some point).
The implications of this holding were potentially quite profound. Apprendi
effectively said that certain facts had, as a matter of constitutional law, to be
treated as offense elements - and thus found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt
(unless the defendant effectively waived her jury right). The decision threw into
doubt nearly fifty federal criminal statutes and dozens of state statutes that, like
the statute in Apprendi, increased the statutory maximum based on the presence
21
of some fact other than a prior conviction.
The second case was Ring v. Arizona. 22 Ring grew out of a recognition that
the logic of Apprendi also implicated various states' capital sentencing schemes.

17. The Supreme Court first approved of sentencing factors in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S.
79 (1986). A dozen years later, four justices fired a shot across the bow, signaling their discomfort with
the constitutionality of sentencing factors. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 248
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 737 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
18. Apprendi and Monge anchored their objections in the Due Process Clause. Jones, decided the
following term, was the first decision in which the justices who eventually formed the Apprendi majority
signaled their interest in anchoring the doctrine in the Sixth Amendment. Jones v. United States, 526
U.S. 227, 240-52 (1999).
19. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
20. Id. at 489. As for the continuing vitality of Almendarez-Torres, the Court has hinted that the
case may have been wrongly decided. Id. at 489 n. 15. Justice Thomas, the swing vote who joined the
majority in Almendarez-Torres to reject the constitutional challenge to the recidivism enhancement,
likewise candidly hinted that he believes Almendarez-Torres rests on an erroneous premise. Id. at 521
(Thomas, J., concurring). Nonetheless, the Court has denied a writ of certiorari in cases cleanly
presenting the question whether Almendarez-Torres should be overruled. See Colleen P. Murphy, The
Use ofPriorConvictionsAfter Apprendi, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 9.73, 1015-16 nn.226-30 (2004).
21. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apres Apprendi, 12 FED. SENT. REP. 331, app. A-B
(2000).
22. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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Of the 38 states with the death penalty, five employed regimes under which the
judge, rather than the jury, determined whether the defendant should be
sentenced to death. In Ring, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment
required the jury to find the aggravating factors necessary for imposition of the
death penalty. 23 Ring effectively invalidated the schemes of these five states,
which subsequently revised their capital sentencing schemes to24 require that
doubt.
aggravating factors be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
The third and most recent case was last term's decision in Blakely v.
Washington, the constitutional challenge to Washington's sentencing guidelines
The state of Washington employed a
scheme that I mentioned previously.
guideline system where the facts of the crime and the defendant's criminal
history determine a recommended sentencing range within the statutory
maximum. In Blakely's case, he pled guilty to various violent crimes, and the
recommended sentence under the guidelines was 53 months. Just prior to
sentencing, however, the trial judge tagged 37 more months to the sentence
because of the presence of certain "aggravating factors" of cruelty and violence.
The resulting sentence exceeded that recommended under the Guidelines but still
was below the statutory maximum. So, at bottom, Blakely presented the
question whether the Apprendi principle was limited to cases where judicial factfinding exceeds the statutory maximum punishment for the offense (the view of
all federal courts of appeals and all but one state appellate bench at the time) or
whether it extended more broadly to any situation where a judicial finding of fact
extends the sentence outside some prescribed range (the lone view of a single
state supreme court at the time).
The justices from the Apprendi majority bucked the dominant trend and
opted for the broader interpretation. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the majority
explained that Apprendi reflected two principles of historical criminal
jurisprudence - (1) that the truth of any accusation be confirmed by a jury and
(2) that an accusation, to result in punishment, requires proof of facts. While
acknowledging that the statutory maximum for Blakely's crime was ten years,
the majority held that the relevant maximum for Apprendi purposes was not that
figure but, rather, the range prescribed by the Guidelines - namely the range
26
The facts
dictated by the jury's findings or the defendant's admissions.
the
authorize
not
did
explained,
majority
the
plea,
guilty
contained in Blakely's
depended,
departure
That
judge to grant an exceptional upward departure.
instead, on facts outside the plea and, therefore, violated the Apprendi principle.
This trio of cases has supplied us the following constitutional rule, what is
sometimes referred to as the Apprendi or, more recently, the Blakely principle: in
any federal or state prosecution, any fact other than a prior conviction that
increases the maximum penalty range must, as a matter of constitutional law, be
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 609.
Id. at 621 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Id. at 2538.
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proven to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. (As shorthand, I will refer to this
as the "Apprendi" principle for the remainder of my remarks).
Now this may seem like a relatively straightforward and uncontroversial
proposition.
But it actually has broad reaching implications for how
governments structure their criminal codes and how punishment is allocated in
our criminal justice system.
Most critically for purposes of my presentation, this principle applies with
equal force to the states as to the federal government. The Court anchored this
trio of cases in the Sixth Amendment, which, by virtue of the Court's decision in
Duncan v. Louisiana, applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
27
Due Process Clause.
To return to the matrix of issues that we discussed at the outset of my
remarks, consider just some of the ways in which the Apprendi principle re28
allocates the decision making power in state systems of criminal justice:
" It reallocates a share of the punishment power from state judges to state
juries who now (barring a waiver of the jury right) must find nearly all facts
that enhance a defendant's potential punishment. In response, some states
now require the jury to determine aggravating factors during trial. Others
have developed "sentencing juries" who find facts bearing on the
defendant's sentence even after they have made a separate finding of guilt.
Kansas developed such a system after its state supreme court, in a preBlakely decision, relied on Apprendi to invalidate Kansas' sentencing
29
scheme;
* It restricts state legislatures in their ability to design punishment schemes,
perhaps encouraging them to adopt large punishments for narrowly defined
crimes with a series of mandatory minima. High statutory maxima avoid
the Apprendi problem (but not the Blakely problem, depending on how the
state handles criminal sentencing).
Mandatory minima channel the
sentencing decision and yet do not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment under
Harrisand McMillan.
* It calls into doubt the constitutionality of several states' sentencing schemes
and throws into disarray other states' efforts to develop their own
sentencing regime. For those states that choose not to follow Kansas'
model of the "sentencing jury," Blakely pushes them to one of two
alternatives. Either they must return to a system of indeterminate
sentencing (with guidelines at most serving a non-binding advisory
27. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
28. Several organizational authors have provided thoughtful discussions of Blakely's impact on the
states. See Anne Skove, Blakely v. Washington: Implications for State Courts, NAT'L CENTER FOR
STATE CT[S]. (July 16, 2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KIS
_SentenBlakely.pdf; Jon Wool, AggravatedSentencing: Blakely v. Washington - Legal Considerations
for State Sentencing Systems, VERA INST. OF JUST. POL'Y & PRAC. REv. (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.vera.org/publication.pdf/250 477.pdf; Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing:
Blakely v. Washington - Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, VERA INST. OF JUST.
POL'Y & PRAc. REv. (Aug. 2004), availableat http://www.vera.org/publication-pdf/242_456.pdf.
29. State v. Gould, 23 P.3d 801 (Kan. 2001).
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function); or they must use guidelines to determine a suspect's parole
eligibility within the maximum possible prison term authorized by the
conviction;
" It may trim state legislatures' ability to craft determinate sentencing
schemes that enhance the defendant's sentence;
" It could strain the budgets of state courts that may have to resolve more
cases through trials or cumbersome sentencing hearings;
* Finally, the doctrine could ultimately allocate greater power to state
prosecutors who effectively circumvent many of the Court's newly
announced restrictions through creative plea-bargaining and the design of
guilty pleas that waive the jury right. This last effect may be the most
important. According to the most recent nationwide data, I have found over
90% of all felony convictions in state courts end in guilty pleas.
of
To put into perspective the impact of this line of cases on principles
30
statute:
following
the
enact
to
were
Congress
that
imagine
federalism,
(1) In a state criminal trial, a jury, not a judge, must find any fact (other
than the fact of prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum
penalty for the crime;
(2) In a state capital sentencing proceeding, only the jury, not a judge,
may make the factual findings of aggravating circumstances necessary to
render the defendant eligible for the death penalty;
(3) Under state sentencing guidelines, a jury, not a judge, must find any
fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the sentencing range
beyond that specified in the guidelines.
Defenders of federalism would instantly file a constitutional challenge to
this statute. They would bemoan the burdens that such a federal law would place
on the states. They would cry "foul" at this unspeakable act of federal
overreaching. Justices Scalia and Thomas, among the most ardent defenders of
federalism, including in the criminal justice arena, are among the justices who
presumably would be most sympathetic to a federalism-based attack on this
hypothetical congressional enactment. 3 1 Yet, ironically, they also are among the
most ardent defenders of the Apprendi principle, which accomplishes precisely
the same anti-federalist result via judicial decision.
So the dilemma - especially for the Court, but also for state policy makers
affected by the Apprendi principle and for litigants - is whether one can
harmonize the principle with its anti-federalist implications. I believe that it is
possible, though difficult, to harmonize the two principles. The key, in my
opinion, is for the Court to begin to reconsider whether every judicial
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment also must bind the states. In other words,
the Court should build on some of the history surrounding the constitutional jury
right and some research on the incorporation doctrine to limit the reach of the
30.

I discuss this hypothetical statute in detail in my essay in the Federal Sentencing Reporter. See

Rutledge, Apprendi and Federalism, 17 FED. SENT. REP. 100, 100 (2004).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706
(1999); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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Apprendi doctrine in matters involving the states.
Such an approach should appeal to both Justices Scalia and Thomas. For
one thing, it would be truer to the Constitution's text - the jury right appears not
only in the Sixth Amendment but also Article III, suggesting that the Framers
especially saw this guarantee primarily as one binding the federal government
alone. 32 For another thing, it would be more consistent with the history of the
Constitution itself: the Framers considered - and rejected - an amendment that
would have prohibited the states from depriving a citizen of a right to a jury
trial.33 Thus, the text of the Constitution and the history support the notion that
the jury right in the federal constitution was never meant to constrain the
administration of state systems of criminal justice.
For nearly one hundred and seventy years, that was the governing doctrine.
States remained immune from whatever gloss the federal courts chose to put on
the jury rights in the federal Constitution. Instead, the jury rights in the states
developed in whatever way the state courts chose to interpret analogous
provisions of their own constitutions.
Then along came Duncan v. Louisiana.3 4 Duncan presented the question
whether the Sixth Amendment applied to a state where the state's constitution
only required a jury for offenses punishable by death or hard labor (it is worth
noting that Louisiana had a right to jury trial in its state constitution). More
broadly, Duncan represented one battle in a longer fight occurring on the Court
at that time over whether the Due Process Clause incorporated the various
provisions of the Bill of Rights. The Court held that the Sixth Amendment did
apply to the states.
Not all justices in Duncan, however, embraced that approach. Both Justice
Fortas and Justice Harlan argued that, even if the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated some protections reflected in the Court's interpretation of the Bill
of Rights, it need not incorporate all of those protections. In Justice Fortas's
view:
Neither logic nor history nor the intent of the draftsmen of the Fourteenth
Amendment can possibly be said to require that the Sixth Amendment or
its jury trial provision be applied to the States together with the total gloss
that this Court's decisions have supplied .... There is no reason whatever
for us to conclude that ... we are bound slavishly to follow not only the

Sixth Amendment but all of its bag and baggage, however securely or
insecurely affixed they may be by law and precedent to federal
proceedings.3 5
Justice Fortas's view echoed sentiments that Justice Harlan had expressed
in earlier incorporation cases. For example, in a dissent from a decision holding
that the Fifth Amendment's Privilege Against Self Incrimination applied to the
states, Justice Harlan explained that:
32.
33.
34.
35.

U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
ANNALS OF CONGREss 452 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789).
391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Id. at 171 (Fortas, J., concurring).
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[T]he States under our federal system have the principal responsibility for
defining and prosecuting crimes. The Court endangers this allocation of
responsibility for the prevention of crime when it applies to the States
doctrines developed in the context of federal law enforcement, without
any attention to the special
3 6 problems which the States as a group or
particular States may face.
The Fortas/Harlan methodology charts a course for reconciling the values of
the jury guarantee with the values of federalism. It does not disincorporate the
jury right entirely but limits it to those aspects of the right that, along some
criterion, warrant application against the states. Such an approach offers the
states greater breathing room to adapt their criminal justice systems to their
particular circumstances and encourages the experimentation and diversity
among the states that is one of the great hallmarks of our federalist system of
government.
Is such an approach even possible? Didn't the incorporation cases and,
specifically, Duncan v. Louisiana already settle the question that the Sixth
Amendment and the judicial interpretations of it apply to the states in toto?
Until recently, my answer would candidly have been - yes, Duncan settled
the question. But recent developments in another area of the law - specifically
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment - have
opened the door for the Court to reconsider some of the incorporation
jurisprudence from last century.
The Privileges or Immunities Clause provides that "No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States." 37 Shortly after the states ratified this Amendment, the
38
Supreme Court largely rendered it a dead letter in the Slaughterhouse Cases.
Six terms ago in Saenz v. Roe,3 9 however, a majority of the Supreme Court
revived the clause and relied on it to invalidate 'a California law restricting
benefits to new state residents.
Important for the Apprendi issue, both Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas signed onto the project of resuscitating the Privileges
or Immunities Clause. 4 1 Justice Scalia joined the majority, which relied on the
clause to invalidate the statute challenged in Saenz. Justice Thomas, while
dissenting, agreed with the principle that the Slaughterhouse Cases read the
Privileges or Immunities Clause far too narrowly and expressed a willingness to
reconsider the decision. 42 Thus, both Justices Scalia and Thomas have gone on
record as supporting the Privileges or Immunities Clause as a potential restraint
on the conduct of states.
The Court's resuscitation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides
36. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Abbate v. United
States, 359 U.S. 187, 195 (1959)).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
38. 83 U.S. 36(1873).
39. 526 U.S. 489 (1998).
40. Id. at 502-04.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 527-28 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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an avenue for beginning the process of decoupling that Justices Fortas and
Harlan recognized and that I described above. Once one digs into the history
surrounding the Privileges or Immunities Clause, one finds valuable evidence
indicating that the drafters of that Clause intended for it, not the Due Process
Clause, to serve as the vehicle for incorporating some of the provisions of the
Bill of Rights against the states. 4 3 If one accepts that historical premise, then the
Privileges or Immunities Clause suddenly becomes a potentially clean slate on
which the Court could write a new era of incorporation jurisprudence, one more
sensitive to the federalism concerns raised by the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases.
Indeed, Justice Thomas only recently penned an opinion expressing his
willingness to revisit the Court's incorporation jurisprudence where it flies in the
face of constitutional history.4 4 Thus, both justices, perhaps the swing votes in
Apprendi matters, are particularly well positioned to be the fonts of a new
jurisprudence that better harmonizes the conflicting values of the jury right with
federalism.
If you have bought into the project so far, this leaves us with one final
question - how is the Court to determine the criterion by which to decide what
aspects of the jury right should be incorporated against the states and what
aspects should remain limited to federal cases. Justices Fortas and Harlan, the
architects of the thesis that I am setting forth here, suggested that the proper
criterion is fundamental fairness - that is, incorporate against the states only
those constitutional rules that seem to be dictated by notions of fairness.
That approach, while certainly plausible, seems unlikely to resonate with a
majority of the Court today, particularly Justices Scalia and Thomas, the justices
whom I have suggested provide the key to limiting Apprendi's inroads on state
prerogatives. If our goal is to appeal to those swing justices, I would submit that
history supplies a studier criterion - that is, does the state practice depart from
the practice in place at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified?
Specifically, does it strip the jury of some fact-finding power that it traditionally
enjoyed at that time? Such a historical approach gels with the jurisprudence that
Justices Scalia and Thomas generally have developed in addressing the meaning
of other provisions of the Civil War Amendments. As I have explained
elsewhere, I believe that a historical approach comports reasonably well with
provides a workable guidepost for resolving
current constitutional doctrine and
45
various post-Apprendi questions.
During the symposium, one of the participants, United States District Judge
Laurence Piersol, suggested that my proposal - using the Privileges or
Immunities Clause as a font for a new era of "incorporation" - would work
43. See WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1089-95 (1953); MICHAEL K. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE 100 (1986); William

J. Rich, Taking Privileges or Immunities Seriously: A Call to Expand the Constitutional Canon, 87
MINN. L. REV. 153 (2002).
44. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2328 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
45. Rutledge, supra note 30, at 104-05.
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"much mischief." By this comment, I infer he meant that the approach proposed
here would lead courts down a path of reopening a whole range of incorporation
doctrines that were believed to be settled - the Fourth Amendment, the
exclusionary rule, and the Eighth Amendment, just to name a few examples.
I have tremendous respect for Judge Piersol and take his criticism quite
seriously. Ultimately, though, I do not believe that my thesis necessarily leads to
the "mischief' that he describes, for two reasons. First, my thesis is subject to a
very important limiting principle - namely, one should limit the
"disincorporation" (or the reincorporation through the Privileges or Immunities
Clause) to those rights where there is clear evidence that the Framers did not
intend for a particular right to apply to the states. The jury right here satisfies
that test because we have unambiguous textual and historical evidence that the
Framers did not intend to apply the federal jury guarantee to the states.
Second, nothing in my proposal bars the states from interpreting their own
state constitutions to embrace an Apprendi principle. Thus, it is entirely possible
that we may achieve the exact same results under my proposal as we do under
Blakely. The difference, however, is that under my proposal those results are
achieved through states (whether legislatures or courts) exercising a prerogative
about how to organize their criminal justice systems. By contrast, under the
current regime, five members of the Court impose that view on the states
through a constitutional pronouncement of dubious historical pedigree.
This completes my remarks on the relationship between the jury right and
federalism. For those of you unfamiliar with this area of the law, I hope that
they have given you a sense of the doctrine and the values at stake. For those of
you already familiar with it, I hope that these remarks have deepened your
thinking about this important area of constitutional criminal law. At the end of
the presentations or after the symposium, I would be happy to answer your
questions. Thank you.

